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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing offers reduced capital expenditure, operational risks, complexity and maintenance, and increased 
scalability as well as providing services at different abstraction levels, namely Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-
Service(PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). The paper highlighted various threats in cloud computing networking, 
and also proffered solution by discussing extensively various security measures to be enforced on the system to achieve 
security to a large extent. This paper presents a security architecture that enables a user of cloud networking to define 
security requirements and enforces them in the cloud networking infrastructure.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Cloud computing is a technology which provide you a 
service through which you can use all the computer 
hardware and software sitting on your desktop, or 
somewhere inside your network but they are not actually 
installed on your computer, it is provided for you as a 
service by another company and accessed over the Internet 
[Priya, 2011]. Cloud computing, or computing as a utility, 
is a new computing paradigm. It allows third party service 
providers (i.e. cloud service providers) to provide a 
centralized pool of configurable computing resources to 
end-users. The end-users (individuals and enterprises) 
could make on-demand accesses to these resources and use 
them to implement their services according to their ever-
changing requirements. In this way, the end-users do not 
need to deploy and manage their own computing services 
thus enabling fast deployment and minimum operational 
and management overheads [Ren et al, 2011].  
 
 Cloud computing encompasses any subscription-based or 
pay-per-use service that, in real time over the Internet, 
extends information technology‘s existing capabilities. 
Cloud computing promotes availability, zero maintenance, 
subscription based service [Asha, 2012].  
 
 
 
 
 
In cloud computing, remote servers are being entrusted 
with users’ data, software and computations, thus, making 
it open up to a new world of opportunities.  Moreover, 
consumers still have control over the deployed 
applications.  Cloud computing services benefit from 
economies of scale achieved through versatile use of 
resources, specialization, and other efficiencies [Wayne, 
2011]. However, it is an emerging form of distributed 
computing still in its infancy which stipulates that cloud 
computing is still a work in progress. While Cloud 
computing brings promising benefits, it also introduces 
some challenging security and privacy issues that need to 
be considered and addressed prior to committing to  a 
cloud computing strategy. Understanding who is 
responsible for what is vital before moving to cloud [Asha, 
2012]. These issues include how data owners (i.e. entities 
which have outsourced their data) could be assured that 
their data are used in an authorized manner, how the 
confidentiality of outsourced data be protected while still 
allowing legitimate accesses of data, or allowing 
computations being performed on the data, how the 
trustworthiness of service metering be assured so that end-
users are not charged unfairly, etc.  
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In computing generally, there is a trade-off between 
functionality and achieving better security [Adkins et al, 
2003]. Consider a set of primitives required to implement 
some functionality. As the functionality of a system 
increases, we usually need more primitives to implement 
them. The probability that none of the primitives has a 
security flaw decreases (security is often an all-or-nothing 
game, as a single flaw can render the entire system 
vulnerable). Thus, simplicity and less functionality (fewer 
primitives) usually contribute to increased security 
[Schneier, 1997].  
Contrary to this popular belief, this research provides an 
overview of the security and privacy challenges relevant to 
cloud computing and points out measures that should taken 
when outsourcing data, applications, and infrastructure to a 
public cloud environment. 
 
1.1 Research Problem  
Due to the advantages of greater flexibility and availability 
in obtaining computing resources at lower cost, the interest 
in cloud computing has grown rapidly in recent years.  
However, security and privacy are a concern for end-users 
(individuals and enterprises) considering transitioning 
applications and data to cloud computing environments, 
and form the impetus behind this paper. Cloud computing 
is more than simply a technical challenge. By putting our 
personal data on remote servers, we risk losing control 
over that data. Security is an essential component of strong 
privacy safeguards in all online computing environments, 
but security alone is not sufficient. Consumers and 
businesses are willing to use online computing only if they 
trust that their data will remain private and secure [Priya 
2011]. 
 
These issues include how data owners (i.e. entities which 
have outsourced their data) could be assured that their data 
are used in an authorized manner, how the confidentiality 
of outsourced data be protected while still allowing 
legitimate accesses of data, or allowing computations being 
performed on the data, how the trustworthiness of service 
metering be assured so that end-users are not charged 
unfairly, etc.  
 
Researchers have shown that users should have a well 
defined methodology before migrating to cloud computing. 
The less control you have for your data means more you 
have to trust the providers‘security policies. Security and 
privacy issues have to be addressed from the initial phase, 
considering after the deployment will be more 
complicated, expensive and risky [Asha 2012]. 
The usual security norm in public cloud is service level 
agreements (SLAs) which talks about the expected level of 
services provided by the cloud provider to the cloud 
consumer. Consumers  make sure that the contract they 
sign have reference to the security measures that the 
provider have in mind and also make sure that the contract 
meet the expected security norms from their business 
perspective [ Asha 2012]. The complete terms and 
conditions for a cloud service agreement are usually 
stipulated in multiple documents, which can typically 
include a Service Level Agreement (SLA), privacy policy, 
acceptable use policy, and terms of use [Bradshaw et al, 
2010]. 
 
Two types of service agreements exist: predefined non-
negotiable agreements and negotiated agreements [Wayne 
& Timothy, 2011]. Non-negotiable agreements are in many 
ways the basis for the economies of scale enjoyed by 
public cloud computing. The terms of service are 
prescribed completely by the cloud provider. They are 
typically not written with attention to federal privacy and 
security requirements. Furthermore, with some offerings, 
the provider can make modifications to the terms of service 
unilaterally (e.g., by posting an updated version online) 
without giving any direct notification to the cloud 
consumer [Bradshaw et al., 2010].  
End- users who want to deploy critical applications can 
think about private clouds over public clouds which offer 
better insight and control over security and privacy [Asha 
2012]. 
 
1.2 Research  Objectives 
The objectives of this research are to provide an overview 
of cloud computing and the security and privacy challenges 
involved. This paper discusses the threats, technology 
risks, and protective measures for cloud environments, and 
provides the insight needed to make informed information 
technology decisions on their treatment.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Many of the features that make cloud computing attractive, 
however, can also be at odds with traditional security 
models and controls [Wayne & Timothy, 2011]. 
Cloud computing does raise a number of important policy 
questions concerning how end-users (people, 
organizations, and governments) handle information and 
interactions in this environment. The key questions of 
Cloud Computing as it is shared and its on-demand nature 
include but limited to the following; 
• how data owners (i.e. entities which have 
outsourced their data) could be assured that their 
data are used in an authorized manner,  
• how the confidentiality of outsourced data can be 
protected while still allowing legitimate 
accesses of data, or allowing computations 
being performed on the data, 
• how the trustworthiness of service metering be 
assured so that end-users are not charged 
unfairly, etc.  
 
1.4 Scope  
This paper provides an overview of public cloud 
computing and the security and privacy challenges 
involved; discusses the threats, technology risks, and 
protective measures for  cloud computing environments, 
and provides the perceptiveness needed to make essential 
information technology decisions on their treatment. The 
paper does not recommend any specified cloud computing 
service, service arrangement, service agreement, service 
provider, or deployment model. Each end-user (individuals 
and enterprises) must perform its own analysis of its needs, 
and assess, select, engage, and oversee the public cloud 
services that can best fulfill those needs. 
 
1.5 Research Significance 
Cloud computing presents IT organizations with a funda-
mentally different model of operation, one that takes 
advantage of the maturity of web applications and 
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networks and the rising interoperability of computing 
systems to provide IT services. The essence of this paper is 
to make more highlights on cloud computing and the 
security and privacy challenges involved; discusses the 
threats, technology risks, and protective measures for  
cloud computing environments, and provides the 
perceptiveness needed to make essential information 
technology decisions on their treatment and as well provide 
basis/ platform for further research. Fundamentally, the 
researcher believes that further research is needed to 
enhance the security features of these cloud computing 
technologies. 
2. RELATED WORKS  
 
Cloud computing has been defined by NIST as a model for 
enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or cloud provider interaction [Mell, 
2011]. Cloud computing services benefit from economies 
of scale achieved through versatile use of resources, 
specialization, and other practicable efficiencies. However, 
cloud computing is an emerging form of distributed 
computing that is still undergoing evolution and 
standardization. The term itself is often used today with a 
range of meanings and interpretations [Fowler, 2009]. 
Much of what has been written about cloud computing is 
definitional, aimed at identifying important paradigms of 
deployment and use, and providing a general taxonomy for 
conceptualizing important aspects of service [Wayne & 
Timothy, 2011]. 
 
2.1Deployment Models 
Deployment models broadly characterize the management 
and disposition of computational resources for delivery of 
services to consumers, as well as the differentiation 
between classes of consumers. They include 
1. Public cloud computing: is one in which the 
infrastructure and computational resources that it 
comprises are made available to the general 
public over the Internet. It is owned and operated 
by a cloud provider delivering cloud services to 
consumers and, by definition, is external to the 
consumers’ organizations. 
2. Private cloud computing: is one in which the 
computing environment is operated exclusively 
for a single organization. It may be managed by 
the organization or by a third party, and may be 
hosted within the organization’s data center or 
outside of it. A private cloud has the potential to 
give the organization greater control over the 
infrastructure, computational resources, and 
cloud consumers than can a public cloud. 
3. Community cloud computing: falls between 
public and private clouds with respect to the 
target set of consumers. It is somewhat similar to 
a private cloud, but the infrastructure and 
computational resources are exclusive to two or 
more organizations that have common privacy, 
security, and regulatory considerations, rather 
than a single organization. 
4. Hybrid cloud computing: are more complex 
than other deployment models, since they 
involve the composition of two or more clouds 
(private, public or community). Each member 
remains a unique identity, but is bound to others 
through standardized or proprietary technology 
that enables application and data portability to 
them. 
 
While the choice of deployment model has implications for 
the security and privacy of a system, the deployment model 
itself does not dictate the level of security and privacy of 
specific cloud offerings [Wayne & Timothy, 2011]. 
 
2.2 Service Models 
Just as deployment models play an important role in cloud 
computing, service models are also an important 
consideration. A service model can be actualized as a 
public cloud or as any of the other deployment models. 
Three well-known and often-used service models are the 
following: 
 Software-as-a-Service. (SaaS) provides a 
software services to end users. Web-based email 
and Google Documents are perhaps the best-
known example of SaaS. End user gets the access 
to use the software utility but he has no rights to 
change or to modify it. Software is not installed 
on end user computer it is configured in cloud. 
End user has to pay for the service according to 
their requirements. 
 Platform-as-a-Service. (PaaS) provides an end 
user a facility to develop his own application 
which will run on the platform or environment 
provided by the cloud service of some other 
company. The end users may or may not know 
that the application is hosted on the cloud. The 
storage space for user data may be increased or 
decreased per the requirement of the 
applications. A typical example is the Google 
App Engine. 
 Infrastructure-as-a-Service.( IaaS)  provides an 
access to hardware resource such as storage or 
raw computing hardware . Since you buy what 
you need and pay-as-you-go, this is often 
referred to as utility computing. A simple 
example of IaaS: you pay a monthly subscription 
or a per-megabyte/gigabyte fee to have a hosting 
company serve up files for your website from 
their servers. 
 
2.3 Scope and Control Among Cloud Service Models 
[Extracted from Wayne Jansen, Timothy Grance, 
The NIST Guidance on security and privacy in 
public cloud Computing, January 2011.] 
 
The figure below illustrates scope and control between the 
cloud consumer and cloud provider for each of the service 
models discussed above. Five conceptual layers of a 
generalized cloud environment are identified in the centre 
diagram and apply to public clouds, as well as each of the 
other deployment models. The arrows at the left and right 
of the diagram denote the approximate range of the cloud 
provider’s and cloud consumer’s scope and control over 
the cloud environment for each service model. In general, 
the higher the level of support available from a cloud 
provider, the more narrow the scope and control the cloud 
consumer has over the system.  
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The two lowest layers shown denote the physical elements 
of a cloud environment, which are under the full control of 
the cloud provider, regardless of the service model. 
Heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC), power, 
communications, and other aspects of the physical plant 
form the bottom layer, the facility layer, while computers, 
network and storage components, and other physical 
computing infrastructure elements form the hardware 
layer.  
 
The remaining layers denote the logical elements of a 
cloud environment. The virtualized infrastructure layer 
entails software elements, such as hypervisors, virtual 
machines, virtual data storage, and virtual network 
components used to realize the infrastructure upon which a 
computing platform can be established.  
While virtual machine technology is commonly used at this 
layer, other means of providing the necessary software 
abstractions are not precluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Scope and Control among Cloud Service Models 
 
 
Similarly, the platform architecture layer entails 
compilers, libraries, utilities, middleware, and other 
software tools and development components needed to 
implement and deploy applications. The application layer 
represents deployed software applications that are targeted 
towards end-user software clients or other programs, and 
made available via the cloud. 
 
Some have argued that the distinction between IaaS and 
PaaS service models is fuzzy, and in many commercial 
offerings, the two are more alike than different [Armbrust 
et al., 2010]. Nevertheless, these terms do serve a purpose, 
distinguishing between very basic support environments 
and environments having greater levels of support, and 
accordingly different allocations of control and 
responsibility between the cloud consumer and the cloud 
provider. 
 
3. DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
 
A well configured cloud computing architecture is a 
hacker's worst nightmare. Conversely, a poorly configured 
cloud computing architecture is a hacker's best dream. You 
cannot build secure systems until you understand your 
threats [Priya et al., 2011]. 
 
 
Moreover, considering the questions of Cloud Computing 
as it is shared and its on-demand nature which includes the 
following; how data owners (i.e. entities which have 
outsourced their data) could be assured that their data are 
used in an authorized manner, how the confidentiality of 
outsourced data can be protected while still allowing 
legitimate accesses of data, or allowing computations being 
performed on the data, how the trustworthiness of service 
metering be assured so that end-users are not charged 
unfairly, etc., a model with combination of different 
techniques has to be developed and implemented  to 
prevent threats and to keep data on cloud secure and 
private. 
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The major disparity between cloud computing and the 
traditional information technology systems is the increased 
complexity and difficulty in providing adequate 
supervision to maintain accountability and control over 
deployed applications and systems.  
Before the highlighted problems can be tackled, the threat 
or jeopardizes have to be briefly considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Threats 
The dangers to keep data secure and private include but not 
limited to the following: 
• Abusive and scandalous use of cloud 
computing 
The cloud environment offers several added 
utilities to the users including unlimited 
bandwidth and storage capacity to run the 
applications smoothly. Some providers even 
allow other benefits like free limited trial periods 
and additional usage. These user models 
frequently come under the security threats and 
malicious attacks. The areas of concern of these 
attacks include decoding and cracking of the 
password, launching potential attack points and 
executing malicious commands. 
• Breach in interfaces and APIs 
 Cloud computing users have smooth access of a 
comprehensive set of software interfaces or APIs 
manage and execute internal communication 
with cloud services. These APIs play an integral 
part during provisioning, management, 
orchestration, and monitoring of the processes 
running in the cloud environment. The failure to 
monitor the authentication and access control and 
other associated encryption and activity 
monitoring policies provides a pathway for 
malicious attack.  
 
• Insider threat and attack 
These kinds of attacks and breaches are done due 
to the lack of transparency into the cloud 
provider s delivery mechanism and procedure. 
Any superficial command over the level of 
access could lead to various adversaries like 
corporate hacking and organized business threats 
in the domain of business verticals [Priya, 2011]. 
The insider security threat is a well-known issue 
for most organizations and, despite the name, 
applies as well to outsourced cloud services 
[Kowalski, 2008]. Insider threats go beyond 
those posed by current or former employees to 
include contractors, organizational affiliates, and 
other parties that have received access to an 
organization’s networks, systems, and data to 
carry out or facilitate operations. Incidents may 
involve various types of fraud, sabotage of 
information resources, and theft of sensitive 
information. Incidents may also be caused 
unintentionally—for instance, a bank employee 
reportedly sent out sensitive customer 
information to the wrong Google mail account 
[Zetter, 2009].  
Moving data and applications to a cloud 
computing environment operated by a cloud 
provider expands the circle of insiders not only 
to the cloud provider’s staff and subcontractors, 
but also potentially to other customers using the 
service, thereby increasing risk. For example, a 
denial of service attack launched by a malicious 
insider was demonstrated against a well-known 
IaaS cloud [Slaviero et al., 2009]. 
 
 
3.2 Mitigation Techniques 
After the various threats of security and privacy issues 
have been comprehensively analysed, mitigation 
techniques/ strategies can be designed to evaluate 
solutions. 
 
1. Enforcing An Effective Service Agreement 
A service agreement defines the complete terms 
and conditions for access and use of the services 
offered by the cloud provider. It also establishes 
the period of service, conditions for termination, 
and disposition of data (e.g., preservation period) 
upon termination. The complete terms and 
conditions for a cloud service agreement are 
usually stipulated in multiple documents, which 
can typically include a Service Level Agreement 
(SLA), privacy policy, acceptable use policy, and 
terms of use [Bradshaw et al., 2010]. That is, the 
service agreement is the primary means for an 
organization to enforce control and maintain 
accountability over the computing environment 
[Wayne & Timothy, 2011]. 
 
Thus, it is essential the terms of the service 
agreement fully meet the needs of the end-user, 
since responsibilities normally held by the end- 
user are given over to the cloud provider and, 
without sufficient provisions; the consumer 
would have little recourse to address problems 
and resolve to its satisfaction issues that may 
arise. 
Considering the growing number of public cloud 
providers and the broad range of services offered 
by them, organizations must exercise due 
diligence when selecting and moving functions 
to a public cloud. Decision making about 
services and service arrangements entails striking 
a balance between benefits in cost and 
productivity versus drawbacks in risk and 
liability. An organization may be able to employ 
compensating security and privacy controls to 
work around identified shortcomings in a public 
cloud service. Non-negotiable service 
agreements generally limit the range of risk-
mitigation activities available to an end-user, 
while negotiated service agreements, which 
provide greater range and flexibility, necessitate 
careful scrutiny and prioritization of 
requirements that are incorporated into the terms 
of service in order to be cost effective. 
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Therefore, in outsourcing to a cloud provider an 
end-user should carry out prescribed activities to 
remain accountable and mitigate the above-
mentioned security and privacy issues. This 
involves specifying the requirements when 
planning the initiative [Leng, 2003].The end-user 
must identify its security, privacy, and other 
requirements for cloud services, as a criterion for 
the selection of a cloud provider. Common 
security requirements include coverage for the 
following areas [Leng, 2003]:  
 
 
 Personnel requirements, including 
clearances, roles, and responsibilities  
 Regulatory requirements  
 Service availability  
 Problem reporting, review, and 
resolution  
 Information handling and disclosure 
agreements and procedures  
 Physical and logical access controls  
 Network access control, connectivity, 
and filtering  
 Data protection  
 System configuration and patch 
management  
 Backup and recovery  
 Data retention and sanitization  
 Security and vulnerability scanning  
 Risk management  
 Incident reporting, handling, and 
response  
 Continuity of operations  
 Resource management  
 Certification and accreditation  
 Assurance levels  
 Independent auditing of services.  
 Service metering procedures/ measures 
 
Part of the requirements analysis should narrow the choice 
among IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS service models to a single 
selection that is appropriate for the end-users’s specific 
needs and objectives. The responsibilities of both the end- 
user and the cloud provider vary depending on the service 
model. 
 
Establishing an exit strategy is an important part of the 
planning process and should be factored into the 
requirements analysis. It also relates to the organization’s 
contingency and continuity planning activities. The exit 
strategy should cover a normal termination, such as that at 
expiration of the service agreement, and also an 
unexpected termination, such as that due to service 
provider bankruptcy or poor performance [Grance, 2003]. 
The ability to export all of the organization’s data in a 
usable format through a secure, reliable, and efficient 
means, and in a timely manner, is a vital aspect of an exit 
strategy. Other aspects include addressing application 
dependencies on proprietary programming interfaces, 
system calls, and database technologies, as well as the 
recovery of useful metadata that may have accumulated 
within the cloud environment [Wayne & Timothy, 2011]. 
However, include clause regarding data ownership and 
protection of intellectual property in SLA agreement.  
2. Client Side Security 
Cloud computing encompasses a client and a 
server, nonetheless, the client side security is 
always over looked. The first step towards a 
secure data management business is 
strengthening the client side security. To provide 
physical and logical safety to client machine is a 
big challenge. Built in security measures can be 
eluded by an erudite person without much 
difficulty. To maintain secure client, end- users 
should review existing security practices and 
employ additional ones to ensure the security of 
its data. Clients must consider secure VPN to 
connect to the provider.  
 
Web browsers are majorly used in client side to 
access cloud computing services. Cloud 
providers usually provide the consumers with 
APIs which is used by the latter to control, 
monitor the cloud services. It is vital to ensure 
the security of these APIs to protect against both 
accidental and malicious attempts to evade the 
security. The various plug-ins and applications 
available in the web browsers also causes a 
serious threat to the client systems used to access 
the provider. Many of the web browsers do not 
allow automatic updates which will append to the 
security concerns. To ensure secure cloud end- 
users should work on the existing internal 
policies, incorporate automatic update features to 
the web browsers and improvise its security 
strategies if necessary. 
 
3. Cloud Service Providers Side Security 
There exist many security concerns in server 
side. To adopt cloud computing it is necessary to 
ensure providers security measures. To enhance 
the trust factor, providers can get their system 
verified by external organizations or by security 
auditors.  
Aside from the security factor other issues that 
needs attention is about the data in the cloud, if at 
the provider goes bankrupt or being acquired by 
another business. Traditional data centers used to 
have regular security audit and mandatory 
security certifications which ensure the data 
security. Cloud providers should also incorporate 
these measures to assure secure transaction 
among its customers. A secure infrastructure 
ensures and builds confidence that the data stored 
is secure in providers‘side. Proper 
implementation of security measures is 
mandatory in cloud computing [Asha, 2012]. 
Cloud providers should also think beyond the 
customary security practices like restricted user 
access, password protection etc. Physical 
location of stored data is also vital and it‘s the 
responsibility of the provider to choose the right 
location of storage. 
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Restricted user access can vary from simple user 
name/password protection to Completely 
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers 
and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) log in forms. 
When an employee no longer has a business need 
to access datacenter his privileges to access 
datacenter should be immediately revoked. 
Cloud Providers can also consider one time 
password authentication where the clients will 
get one time temporary password from 
SSN/mobile device which helps in data security 
even if password is compromised. 
 
4. Installation And Maintenance Of Firewall 
Installation of firewall and its maintenance is 
mandatory to ensure the protection. A firewall 
should be present in all external interfaces. A list 
of necessary port and services should be 
maintained. Assessment of firewall policies and 
rule sets and reconfiguration of router should be 
done in regular intervals. Build and deploy a 
firewall that denies access from ―untrustedǁ 
sources or applications, and adequately logs 
these events. Build and deploy a firewall that 
restricts access from systems that have direct 
external connection and those which contain 
confidential data or configuration data. [Wayne 
& Grance, 2011]. 
 
5. Data Encryption 
Data encryption is one common approach the 
providers follow to safe guard their clients data 
but the question is whether the data is getting 
stored in encrypted format or not. Many 
providers follow private/public key encryption to 
ensure data security. To store crucial data, end- 
users can think of private or hybrid cloud where 
the data will be in secure corporate firewall. 
Encryption /decryption key should be kept 
secured.  
 
6. Certification and Auditing 
Providers should allow the customers to 
determine the security measures followed data 
storage details so that the customers can ensure 
the data security policies of the providers. 
Data access to the cloud by the employees should 
be monitored and recorded so that the providers 
will be able to furnish the detailed report of who 
has accessed what data at a given point of time. 
Before moving any sensitive data to the cloud; 
consumers should ensure that the providers are 
certified by external agencies and they follow the 
expected security standards and practices [Asha, 
2012]. Regular auditing should be conducted  
 
7. Data Sanitization 
Data sanitization is essential for cloud security 
especially since the data is stored in a common 
platform. Sensitive data should be removed from 
storage devices when the particular device is 
moved to different location or when it‘s removed 
from a particular service. Data refinement is 
valid in case of backed up data also. Data 
sanitizations should be done at the right time  
 
8. Back Up and Recovery 
 The cloud end- users will never be able to make 
out the exact storage location of their records 
because data is stored in distributed location. 
Hence, data backup and recovery is essential.  
Backup software should include public cloud 
APIs, enabling simple backup and recovery 
across major cloud storage vendors, such as 
Amazon S3, Nirvanix Storage Delivery Network, 
Rackspace and others, and giving end- users 
flexibility in choosing a cloud storage vendor to 
host their data vault.  
One debatable question is whether to back up the 
entire data or to backup critical and vital data. If 
provider agrees to backup crucial data then the 
question arises on how to determine the priority 
of data. The easiest, least complicated and the 
best way is to protect the entire workstation or 
the server. It is critical for the backup application 
to encrypt confidential data before sending it 
offsite to the cloud, protecting both data-in-
transit over a WAN to a cloud storage vault and 
data-at-rest at the cloud storage site. However, 
frequent data backup policy should be in place  
 
 
9. Identity and Access Management 
Identity and Access management eliminates the 
need for sharing the passwords and also allows 
the implementation of security best practices To 
ensure secure transaction, business employ two 
levels of security system; one in client side and 
another in the server side which is tiresome and 
may not be feasible always. Identity federation, 
popularized with the introduction of service 
oriented architectures, is one solution that can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, such as with 
the Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) standard or the OpenID standard. 
 
A growing number of cloud providers support 
the SAML standard and use it to administer users 
and authenticate them before providing access to 
applications and data. SAML provides a means 
to exchange information, such as assertions 
related to a subject or authentication information, 
between cooperating domains. SAML request 
and response messages are typically mapped 
over the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), 
which relies on the eXtensible Markup Language 
(XML) for its format. SOAP messages are 
digitally signed. For example, once a user has 
established a public key certificate for a public 
cloud, the private key can be used to sign SOAP 
requests. SOAP message security validation is 
complicated and must be carried out carefully to 
prevent attacks. For example, XML wrapping 
attacks have been successfully demonstrated 
against a public IaaS cloud [Gruschka, 2009]. 
XML wrapping involves manipulation of SOAP 
messages. A new element (i.e., the wrapper) is 
introduced into the SOAP Security header; the 
original message body is then moved under the 
wrapper and replaced by a bogus body 
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containing an operation defined by the attacker 
[Gajek et al., 2009]. The original body can still 
be referenced and its signature verified, but the 
operation in the replacement body is executed 
instead. SAML alone is not sufficient to provide 
cloud-based identity and access management 
services. The capability to adapt cloud subscriber 
privileges and maintain control over access to 
resources is also needed. As part of identity 
management, standards like the eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
can be used by a cloud provider to control access 
to cloud resources, instead of using a proprietary 
interface. XACML focuses on the mechanism for 
arriving at authorization decisions, which 
complements SAML‘s focus on the means for 
transferring authentication and authorization 
decisions between cooperating entities. XACML 
is capable of controlling the proprietary service 
interfaces of most providers, and some cloud 
providers already have it in place. Messages 
transmitted between XACML entities are 
susceptible to attack by malicious third parties, 
making it important to have safeguards in place 
to protect decision requests and authorization 
decisions from possible attacks, including 
unauthorized disclosure, replay, deletion and 
modification [keleta et al., 2005]. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the mouth –watering benefits and importance of 
cloud computing, it has some disadvantages over privacy 
and security issues. This research has comprehensive 
discussed the issues and the mitigating strategies. Though 
the paper does not specify any cloud computing service, 
service arrangement, service agreement, service provider, 
or deployment model, it would channel end-users 
(individuals and enterprises) towards the path that can best 
fulfill their needs. 
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